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developed on the ground; and (4) where race is not an element of labor
oppression. On the other hand, there is no reason to follow the Bailey Court in
pretending that race is irrelevant. When a particular method of labor extraction
is applied disproportionately to groups defined by race, sex, or other criteria
that tend to indicate vulnerability, it should be scrutinized with special care.116
iii. a standard for assessing labor rights claims under
the thirteenth amendment
In addition to the right to quit, various other labor rights have been
claimed under the Thirteenth Amendment, including the right to change
employers, the right to set one’s wages (as opposed to wage setting by
government or employer cartels), the right to refrain from working altogether
(in challenges to vagrancy laws), the right to strike, and the right to organize
unions.117 Given that the text of the Amendment does not mention the right to
quit or any other right, the question arises: what principles can guide a
conscientious interpreter in determining whether a particular right is implied
by the ban on slavery and involuntary servitude? The term “involuntary
servitude” does not, by itself, supply the answer to these questions. As
recounted in Part I, not even the inalienable right to quit could be derived
without making interpretive choices. For guidance in resolving other labor
rights claims, then, it would seem that the obvious place to look is the Supreme
Court’s handling of those choices.
Justice Robert Jackson’s opinion for the Court in Pollock v. Williams
contains the Court’s most extensive discussion of the issue. It suggests that the
standard for determining whether a given labor right is protected by the
Thirteenth Amendment hinges on whether the right is necessary to provide
workers with the “power below” and employers the “incentive above” to
prevent “a harsh overlordship or unwholesome conditions of work.”118 This
language closely tracks that of Bailey v. Alabama, which justified the right to
quit as necessary to prevent “that control by which the personal service of one
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Even outright slavery is so thoroughly disguised that the intensity of scrutiny is highly
relevant. See, e.g., KEVIN BALES, DISPOSABLE PEOPLE: NEW SLAVERY IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
26-28, 62-63, 84-85, 106-07, 137-38, 169, 237-38 (rev. ed. 2004) (reporting that many
enslaved people fail to protest or attempt escape because of social or religious norms, that
slavery is hidden behind fictive contracts, and that the actual owners may be distanced from
the slave by layers of subcontractors).
See supra note 4.
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Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 18 (1944); Cox, supra note 7, at 576-77.
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man is disposed of or coerced for another’s benefit.”119 Two central features of
involuntary servitude are to be negated: domination (“control,” “harsh
overlordship”) and exploitation (the disposal of one person’s labor for
“another’s benefit,” “unwholesome conditions”). This dual focus echoes the
reasoning offered by proponents of the right to quit from the days of the
Northwest Ordinance forward.120
The Court has thus far declined, however, to use Pollock as a standard for
assessing other rights claims. For example, the Court failed to apply Pollock—or
any other standard—to the labor movement’s claim of a Thirteenth
Amendment right to strike.121 Furthermore, the Court has provided no
explanation for its approach or, more accurately, lack of approach. This Part
assesses the fit of the Pollock principle with (A) the text of the Thirteenth
Amendment; (B) its early history; and (C) the case law.
A. The Pollock Principle and the Constitutional Text
If the Amendment were concerned solely with enabling workers to escape
servitude, then the Pollock principle’s focus on preventing domination and
exploitation in the employment relation might appear misplaced. But the
prohibited condition of “involuntary servitude” may be negated in either of
two ways: (1) by rendering servitude “voluntary,” or (2) by transforming
“servitude” into something else that is constitutionally acceptable. Pollock takes
the latter approach. The right to quit is justified not on the ground that it will
enable workers to escape servitude (thereby rendering servitude voluntary for
those who remain), but as the “defense against oppressive hours, pay, working
conditions, or treatment.” By quitting or threatening to quit, workers can exert
a “power below” giving employers an “incentive above” to prevent “a harsh
overlordship or unwholesome conditions of work.”122 Formulating this
reasoning in terms of the constitutional text, the right to quit provides the
“power below” and “incentive above” to prevent the employment relation from
sinking into “servitude.”
This reading is neither confirmed nor excluded by the generally accepted
definitions of “servitude” as of the 1860s, which, unfortunately for precision,
encompassed a wide range of usages. The term could be a synonym for slavery
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219 U.S. 219, 241 (1911).
See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
See infra Section VI.A.
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Pollock, 322 U.S. at 18.
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of exploitation and subjugation—not of specific, nineteenth-century methods
of labor control.
Within the employment context, then, the Bailey/Pollock standard specifies
the kind of employment relation that is “akin to African slavery” and produces
“like undesirable results.” On their facts, Bailey and Pollock do not go beyond
the line of physical or legal coercion. However, the principle of those cases
condemns all forms of power that effectively eliminate the workers’ “power
below” and the employers’ “incentive*****above” to avoid a harsh overlordship or
unwholesome conditions of work. Viewing the case law as a whole, it would
seem that the standard should be applied in future cases unless it is
unworkable or imprudent.
iv. a closer look at the pollock principle
For the reader who is persuaded that the Pollock principle warrants serious
consideration, questions arise as to its workability and likely consequences.
This Part examines (A) the particular role of the Pollock principle in negating
involuntary servitude, (B) the workability of the principle as a standard for
assessing labor rights claims, and (C) prudential problems arising from the
principle
A. The Role of the Pollock Principle in Negating Involuntary Servitude
The project of negating a condition, here slavery or involuntary servitude,
entails basic choices about objectives. Lea VanderVelde offers an illuminating
formulation. Is the goal accomplished, she asks, when the condition is
“obliterated into nothingness, like eliminating a spot on an otherwise pure
fabric, or vanquishing a travesty?” Or would that approach defeat the purpose
by creating “a vacuum into which other forms of exploitation and oppression
could flow”?179 The cases on involuntary servitude exhibit two contrasting
approaches to labor rights claims, each of which reflects a distinct set of
answers to these questions. One is the definitional approach deployed in
Kozminski and other decisions applying statutory bans on “involuntary
servitude.” This approach seeks to eliminate the travesty of involuntary
servitude as if it were a spot on an otherwise pure fabric. It protects only those
rights that, by their absence, define the condition of involuntary servitude. It
asks whether, without the claimed right, the individual laborer would be in the

179.

Lea VanderVelde, The Thirteenth Amendment of Our Aspirations, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 855,
875-76 (2007).
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prohibited condition of “involuntary servitude.” If so, then the right is
protected. On this view, the inalienable right to quit can be explained as
negating the “involuntary” element of involuntary servitude. This definitional
approach provides the irreducible minimum of constitutional protection. At the
very least, the constitutional command that slavery and involuntary servitude
“not exist” must guarantee the right to be free from those conditions.
Pollock adds a second, functional approach to labor rights claims. Here,
involuntary servitude is seen not as a spot on an otherwise pure fabric, but as a
system of unfree labor locked in struggle with the system of free labor. The
negative goal of obliterating involuntary servitude is intertwined with the
positive goal of “maintain[ing] a system of completely free and voluntary labor
throughout the United States.”180 The Thirteenth Amendment guarantees a
given right not only if its absence ipso facto defines the prohibited condition of
involuntary servitude, but also if it is essential to the functioning of the free
labor system.
Where the definitional approach seeks to enforce directly each individual’s
freedom from involuntary servitude, the functional approach protects workers’
rights to participate in the free labor system, which, in turn, operates to
prevent involuntary servitude. Within the employment relation, the
Amendment protects all rights necessary to provide workers with the “power
below” and employers with the “incentive above” to remedy “a harsh
overlordship or unwholesome conditions of work.” The workers’ power and
the employers’ incentive are generated not at the individual level, between a
particular laborer and employer, but in the aggregate, through the workings of
the free labor system. This is apparent in Justice Jackson’s formulation of the
right at issue: not simply as the right to quit (which, given that the law
challenged in Pollock criminalized quitting, might have been the more natural
framing), but as “the right to change employers.”181 By the time that an
individual laborer has exercised this right, she is working for another employer
and cannot benefit directly from whatever influence her “power below” might
have exerted on her previous employer. Systemically, however, each worker’s
exercise of the right operates to ensure that employers who seek to impose
harsh domination and unwholesome conditions will be punished with high
employee turnover, while those who offer better terms will be rewarded with
loyalty. Even if the particular rights claimant is not in imminent danger of

180.
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Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 17 (1944); see also Bailey, 219 U.S. at 245 (noting the
Amendment’s purpose to “safeguard the freedom of labor upon which alone can enduring
prosperity be based”). For similar statements by the Amendment’s Framers, see infra note
185.
Pollock, 322 U.S. at 17-18.
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involuntary servitude, the right may be protected as “in general” necessary to
provide workers with an effective “defense against oppressive hours, pay,
working conditions, or treatment.”182
Consider, for example, Shaw v. Fisher, a case that—unlike Pollock—actually
did involve a constraint on the right to change employers. In Shaw, a
sharecropper named Carver broke his contract with Shaw, and subsequently
found employment with Fisher.183 Shaw sued Fisher for the common law tort
of harboring a worker who had quit another employer in breach of contract.
The South Carolina Supreme Court held that the Thirteenth Amendment had
“annulled” the tort, even though Carver was free to quit and there was nothing
in the opinion to indicate that he lacked alternative means of supporting
himself, for example by working with family members, going into business for
himself, or migrating outside the state.184 Apparently, Carver’s freedom to
participate in the free labor system was at stake.
This functional approach echoed the proceedings and legislative
enactments of the Thirty-Eighth and Thirty-Ninth Congresses, which
proposed the Thirteenth Amendment and shaped its early enforcement.
Senators and representatives stressed that the Amendment would protect the
freedom of labor, including a set of rights extending far beyond those that
defined the conditions of slavery and involuntary servitude. Among those
mentioned, for example, were the rights to “enjoy the rewards of his own
labor,” to “name the wages for which he will work,” and to change
employers.185 The Peonage Act of 1867 prohibited “voluntary” as well as

182.
183.
184.

185.

1518

Id. at 18.
Shaw v. Fisher, 102 S.E. 325, 326 (S.C. 1920); see infra text accompanying notes 231-232.
Id. at 326-27. The court drew on Bailey, quoting its admonition that the purpose of the
Amendment was to “render impossible any state of bondage; to make labor free . . . .” Id. at
326 (quoting Bailey, 219 U.S. at 241).
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2990 (1864) (statement of Rep. Ingersoll); CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1160 (1866) (statement of Sen. Windom); id. at 111 (statement
of Sen. Wilson) (discussing freedman’s right to “work when and for whom he pleases”);
VORENBERG, supra note 20, at 235 (observing that the Amendment was intended to protect
natural rights, and that the “right to the fruit of one’s labor was the natural right most
commonly mentioned”). For general statements concerning the purpose of the Amendment
not merely to abolish slavery, but to establish freedom, see, for example, CONG. GLOBE, 38th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2985 (1864) (statement of Rep. Kelley) (“Let us establish freedom as a
permanent institution, and make it universal.”); id. at 2983 (statement of Rep. Mallory)
(complaining that proponents of the Amendment seek to supplant slavery by the “system of
free labor”); id. at 2944 (statement of Rep. Higby) (observing that passage of the
Amendment represents the choice between slavery and “free institutions and free labor”); id.
at 2615 (statement of Rep. Morris) (advocating passage of the Thirteenth Amendment on
the ground that “this is not a mere struggle between the North and the South; it is a conflict
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involuntary peonage, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 protected a broad array
of freedoms against race-based (and, in the popular understanding,
race-neutral) infringements, including the rights “to make and enforce
contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell,
hold, and convey real and personal property.”186
The Pollock approach reflects the unique character of the Thirteenth
Amendment as a rights guarantee that specifies no rights. With regard to an
enumerated right—like the right to bear arms or to speak freely—judges and
legislators might reasonably consider their job done once individuals possess
an enforceable legal entitlement to exercise the right. But Thirteenth
Amendment rights cannot be considered successful unless they are actually
exercised to ensure that “[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude . . . shall
exist.”187 If workers choose not to exercise their rights, then the rights
guarantees have failed, and the government must find some other way to fulfill
the constitutional command.188 By itself, the definitional approach invites this
kind of failure. It waits until a worker has been deprived of a right that, by its
absence, defines the condition of involuntary servitude. It is unlikely that
workers who have been crushed into involuntary servitude will suddenly
discover and exert the “power below” to erase it. Workers who are immediately
threatened with servitude are likely to be relatively vulnerable, lacking the
economic, social, cultural, political, and legal resources to resist. Moreover,
subjugation typically involves repeated experiences of defeat, leading to
demoralization and self-abnegation.189 If constitutional enforcement focuses

186.

187.

188.

189.

between two systems; a controversy between right and wrong”); id. at 1440 (statement of
Sen. Harlan) (advocating the Thirteenth Amendment on the ground that even slaveholders
would benefit from “a change of their system of labor from compulsory to voluntary”); and
id. at 1369 (statement of Sen. Clark) (asserting that the Amendment will “plant new
institutions of freedom”).
Peonage Act of 1867, ch. 187, § 1, 14 Stat. 546; Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat.
27. On the scope of the Civil Rights Act and its grounding in the Thirteenth Amendment,
see supra note 95 and accompanying text.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. The Amendment bans those conditions not solely out of
concern for the individual victim, but also—as the Pollock Court, echoing the Framers,
observed—for all other workers “with whom his labor comes in competition.” Pollock, 322
U.S. at 18; see also VanderVelde, supra note 2, at 445-48 (documenting the Framers’ concern
with the impact of slavery and involuntary servitude on free laborers).
This was the situation in New Mexico during the lead-up to the Peonage Act of 1867. As
related in Congress, New Mexican peons already had an enforceable legal right to depart
their employers, but many lacked the desire to do so. See supra notes 39-40 and
accompanying text.
Studies of power suggest that the experience of subjugation tends to spawn feelings of
powerlessness and acceptance, which are fostered and reinforced by socialization. See
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exclusively on these workers, then its efficacy will depend on the willingness of
government to commit the financial and other resources necessary to detect
and root out practices of unfree labor.190 By contrast, Pollock relies on free
workers to exercise and enforce rights before falling into a servile state. Workers
who remain free from harsh domination and unwholesome conditions stand as
both guardians and exemplars of the Amendment’s success; by exercising their
“power below,” they give employers the “incentive above” to provide
nonservile jobs.
B. Workability of the Pollock Principle
The Pollock standard calls for judgments that cannot be reduced to brightline criteria capable of mechanical application. The determination whether a
given claimed right is necessary to provide workers with the “power below”
and employers the “incentive above” to avoid servitude necessarily involves
judgments about how the world works, as well as choices concerning the
significance and weight of precedent, original meaning, tradition, consensus,
and structural considerations bearing on the claimed right. Such open-textured
judgments are, however, endemic to the enterprise of applying broadly worded
rights guarantees. The role proposed here for Pollock in the jurisprudence of
involuntary servitude roughly parallels that of the doctrines of suspect
classifications, fundamental interests, high- and low-value speech, and content
discrimination in the jurisprudence of equal protection and freedom of speech.
Each of these doctrines draws on the history and purposes of a constitutional
provision to construct principles intermediate in specificity between the highly
abstract constitutional text, on the one hand, and tests that can be applied to
the particular facts of specific cases (like strict, intermediate, and rational basis
scrutiny) on the other. None can be implemented without contestable
judgments both about the way the world works (for example, whether a
particular form of speech is important to the channels of political change, or
whether a given classification tends to be based on stereotypes) and about the
significance and weight of the various constitutional sources bearing on the

MURRAY EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS 181-82 (1964); JOHN GAVENTA, POWER
AND POWERLESSNESS: QUIESCENCE AND REBELLION IN AN APPALACHIAN VALLEY 12-13 (1980);
STEVEN LUKES, POWER: A RADICAL VIEW 119-20, 137-39 (2d ed. 2005).
190.

See generally BALES, supra note 116, at 26-29, 237-38 (describing the difficulty of revealing and
eliminating forms of slavery that are disguised by contract and distanced by layers of
functionaries and subcontractors from the ultimate masters, most of whom are
“‘respectable’ businesspeople”).

1520

POPE_PRESS_V2WEB.DOC

4/19/2010 3:25:28 PM

contract, race, and freedom of labor

claimed right (for example, whether indecent speech should be protected
despite the lack of historical or early precedential support).
Pollock’s concept of servitude operates in two domains: subjugation
(“control,” “harsh overlordship”) and exploitation (the disposal of one person’s
labor for “another’s benefit,” “unwholesome conditions of work”). But what,
exactly, is a “harsh overlordship,” and what are “unwholesome conditions of
work”? Throughout the heated controversy over the inalienable right to quit,
both Congress and the Court sidestepped these questions. Instead of defining
and prohibiting the substance of servitude, they sought to provide workers
with the procedural rights necessary to avoid it. By guaranteeing the
procedural “right to change employers” as the means to prevent substantively
“oppressive hours, pay, working conditions, or treatment,” the Court avoided
the need to specify the level of oppression that would trigger the
Amendment.191
Even regarding procedural rights, however, issues may arise that call for
specifying the meaning of “harsh overlordship” and “unwholesome
conditions,” if not by stated definition then by accumulated holdings. The key
judicial opinions and statutes protecting the right to quit were drafted with
relatively poor and powerless workers in mind, for example New Mexican
peons and southern agricultural laborers. But what about relatively privileged
workers? Does a Thirteenth Amendment right, once recognized, extend even to
workers who hold desirable jobs and earn relatively high pay? Consider, for
example, entertainers and professional athletes. Courts have held that although
no person may be enjoined to perform a contract for personal services, a person
who performs “unique” services may be barred from performing those services
for others. The fount of this doctrine was the famous English case of Lumley v.
Wagner, in which an opera singer under contract to Her Majesty’s Theatre was
enjoined from singing for anyone else during the contract term.192
A negative injunction of this type would be unconstitutional if directed at
an unskilled laborer. The Amendment guarantees “the right to change
employers,” and that right is violated by a general prohibition on hiring a
person who is under contract to another. “If no one else could have employed
Carver during the term of his contract with plaintiff,” reasoned one court, “the
result would have been to coerce him to perform the labor required by the
contract; for he had to work or starve.”193 Lumley’s American progeny ignored

191.
192.
193.

Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 18 (1944).
Lumley v. Wagner, (1852) 42 Eng. Rep. 687, 693 (Ch.).
Shaw v. Fisher, 102 S.E. 325, 327 (S.C. 1920) (discussed infra text accompanying notes 231232).
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this principle in particular and the problem of labor freedom generally,
focusing instead on the employer’s need for injunctive relief to secure the
“unique” services of the worker.194 How would the Lumley rule fare under
Pollock?
To begin with, the standard would shift the inquiry away from the
employer’s need for unique services to the worker’s need for the right to choose
the employer for whom she would practice her trade. Suppose, for example,
that a young actor contracted to perform with a particular theater company for
a two-year period. Suppose also that a two-year negative injunction would
likely ruin her acting career, but that she would have little difficulty finding
employment as a cocktail server at any number of bars. Would the negative
injunction violate Pollock? The company might contend that the prospect of
serving cocktails is, unlike the prospect of starvation in Carver’s case,
insufficiently coercive. If cocktail servers are not generally considered to be in a
condition of servitude, then the actor can escape servitude. The company might
also contend that the harsh overlordship and unwholesome conditions
associated with servitude necessarily involve “extreme” abuses like physical
violence,195 and that theater companies do not typically commit such abuses.
The actor might reply that the rights to change employers and to pursue a
chosen calling are both essential elements of a free labor system. She might
point to the centrality of a person’s trade or profession to her happiness and
standing in the community, and argue that if theater companies hold the
power to banish actors from their trade, actors will lack the “power below” to
give theater companies the “incentive above” to avoid a harsh overlordship or
unwholesome conditions of work.196 She might note the possibility of serious

194.
195.
196.
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VanderVelde, supra note 4, at 841-42.
See Oman, supra note 24, at 2072 (proposing that the scope of the Thirteenth Amendment be
limited to “extremely oppressive relationships”).
Cf. Ford v. Jermon, 6 Phila. 6, 7 (Dist. Ct. 1865) (declining to issue negative injunction
enforcing female performer’s promise to sing, and querying: “Is it not obvious that a
contract for personal services thus enforced would be but a mitigated form of slavery, in
which the party would have lost the right to dispose of himself as a free agent, and be, for a
greater or less length of time, subject to the control of another?”). The court’s opinion did
not mention the Thirteenth Amendment, but it echoed the free labor vision propounded by
its Framers. VanderVelde, supra note 4, at 795-99; see also Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d
402, 409-10 (2d Cir. 1949) (Frank, J.). Gardella involved the reserve clause inserted into
professional baseball players’ contracts, according to which the employing team retained the
exclusive right to employ a player for a period of one year after his contract expired. New
York Giants outfielder Danny Gardella violated the reserve clause by playing briefly in the
Mexican League, for which he was barred from baseball for a period of years. His antitrust
suit was dismissed by the District Court and reinstated by the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals. Circuit Judge Jerome Frank, an influential legal realist scholar, explained his vote
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employer abuses (for example unsafe conditions and high rates of exploitation)
even in relatively privileged jobs.197 In line with the doctrinal role of race and
sex proposed here, she might point out that the Lumley rule originally gained
its hold on American law in a series of cases involving efforts by male theater
managers to control the lives of female performers.198 However contentious
these issues might be, they appear susceptible to resolution using ordinary
methods of constitutional reasoning.
Similarly, issues will arise concerning particular threats to labor rights.
Consider the inalienable right to quit. We know that the right is protected
against legal and physical compulsion, but what about economic constraints?
Under the old rule of entireties, for example, a worker was required to serve for
the entire contract period—typically six months or a year—before receiving any
wages. If she quit before the end, she forfeited her wages up to that point.
Would this rule violate Pollock? The standard directs attention away from the
formal distinction between legal and economic compulsion, and toward the
question of whether the rule effectively deprives workers of the “power below”
to give employers the “incentive above” to prevent servitude. The affected
employee might contend that the rule could be “nearly as” effective as penal
sanctions in light of the dire consequences of large monetary losses on
marginal wage laborers, for example malnutrition, loss of shelter, and
consequent harm to physical and mental health.199 She might point out that
the Freedmen’s Bureau set aside such laws, that state courts have held that
economic pressure can constitute coercion under the Thirteenth Amendment,
and that most states had abandoned the rule by the end of the nineteenth

198.

for reinstatement partly by citing the Thirteenth Amendment and opining that the reserve
system “results in something resembling peonage of the baseball player.” He added that “if
the players be regarded as quasi-peons, it is of no moment that they are well paid; only the
totalitarian-minded will believe that high pay excuses virtual slavery.” Id. at 409, 410. Frank
went on to warn, unfortunately without explanation, that he was “not to be understood as
implying that [the player contracts] violate the Thirteenth Amendment or the statutes
enacted pursuant thereto.” Id. at 410. This comment might have indicated either an
inclination to reject any possible Thirteenth Amendment claim, or simply an unwillingness
to confront the issue where it was not essential to resolving Gardella’s case. The reserve
system was eventually abandoned after a lengthy struggle in which Curt Flood, an
African-American center fielder who deeply resented being treated as exchangeable
property, played a central role. BRAD SNYDER, A WELL PAID SLAVE: CURT FLOOD’S FIGHT FOR
FREE AGENCY IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS (2006).
It is estimated, for example, that under the reserve system the rate of exploitation of baseball
players was more than three times the rate under free agency. STANLEY L. ENGERMAN,
SLAVERY, EMANCIPATION & FREEDOM: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 19 n.35 (2007).
VanderVelde, supra note 4, at 819-21.

199.

STEINFELD, supra note 4, at 291, 310.

197.
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century.200 Employers might reply that the rule was abandoned primarily for
reasons other than concerns about worker freedom.201 They might suggest that
a monetary penalty does not exert the kind of extreme coercion that the
Amendment was intended to prohibit. Again, the standard does not
mechanically dictate a result, but the issue appears amenable to resolution by
ordinary methods.
Both of the preceding examples involve the claim that the Thirteenth
Amendment bans only “extreme” forms of labor oppression. Without
attempting a complete discussion of this possibility, a preliminary question
should be raised: against what baseline is the “extreme” character of
oppression to be determined? If “extreme” means unusual or exceptional in
terms of social practice, then a method of labor extraction—no matter how
egregious its impact on workers—might become constitutional by virtue of
widespread use, a result that would conflict with the Pollock standard. Around
the turn to the twentieth century, for example, workers in core industries faced
a high risk of mutilation or death from work-related accidents.202 From our
perspective today, such carnage might appear to be extremely unwholesome,
but at the time it was widely perceived to be routine. A similar problem would
arise if “extreme” means unusual or exceptional in terms of cultural attitudes.
What is perceived as “extreme” about a given form of labor oppression may
have little to do with the actual harshness or unwholesomeness of the practice.
In the decades following enactment of the Thirteenth Amendment, for
example, the exotic and archaic-appearing “padrone” loomed large in public
opinion as the villain responsible for oppressing vulnerable immigrant
workers.203 In fact, however, major corporations—including many that were
considered among the most progressive of their day—not only relied upon
labor supplied by padrones, but also duplicated their methods of labor control.
It was much easier for reformers to direct their energies against the padrones,
who could be depicted as extreme, than against the mainstream American
corporations that were fostering and imitating padronism.204 Under the Pollock

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

See, e.g., Thompson v. Box, 112 So. 597, 599 (Miss. 1927); Shaw v. Fisher, 102 S.E. 325, 327
(S.C. 1920); STEINFELD, supra note 4, at 312; VanderVelde, supra note 2, at 492-93.
SCHMIDT, supra note 34, at 195-96; STEINFELD, supra note 4, at 312.
JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE
WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW (2004).
PECK, supra note 104, at 23.
See id. at 49-51, 67-68, 230. Historians have noted a similar dynamic with regard to the
Mann “White Slavery” Act, which was targeted at “foreigners,” especially Jews. Jennifer M.
Chacón, Misery and Myopia: Understanding the Failures of U.S. Efforts To Stop Human
Trafficking, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2977, 3016 (2006).
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standard, however, what matters is the harshness of subjugation and the
unwholesomeness of conditions, not whether the employers involved are
perceived as exceptional. Adding a requirement of “extreme” oppression might
invite timidity and discourage principled enforcement.
C. Prudential Concerns
In Bailey and Pollock, the Court held that the state statutes at issue
transgressed not only the Peonage Act, but also the Thirteenth Amendment
itself. Instead of relying on the discretion of Congress, the Court affirmatively
adjudged that the Amendment had been violated.205 Usually, however, the
Court defers to Congress in defining violations of the Thirteenth Amendment.
Congress is empowered “rationally to determine what are the badges and the
incidents of slavery” and to eliminate them.206 The question of whether
methods of employer control other than physical or legal coercion amount to
involuntary servitude is, according to the Court, “a value judgment . . . best left
for Congress.”207 Thus, Congress may be empowered to enact legislation
protecting various rights under its Section 2 enforcement power even though
the Court would not, on its own, hold those rights to be protected under
Section 1.
It is also true, however, that the Court routinely enforces many
constitutional provisions that are more difficult to apply than the Involuntary
Servitude Clause. The phrases “freedom of speech” and “equal protection of
the laws,” for example, sweep far more broadly than “involuntary servitude.”
Speech is integral to a vast range of human activities, and statutes invariably
treat some people differently (unequally) from others. Accordingly, these
phrases have given rise to intricate doctrinal structures replete with value
hierarchies (as noted above, for example: high-, intermediate-, and low-value
speech; fundamental and nonfundamental interests; and suspect,
quasi-suspect, and nonsuspect classifications) as well as imprecise phrases like
“substantially related” and “substantial” or “compelling” governmental
interests. Although courts are justified in allowing Congress leeway to protect
Thirteenth Amendment rights, mere difficulty of application cannot justify a
complete judicial retreat from the field.208 Interestingly, the Supreme Court of

205.
206.
207.
208.

Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 24 (1944); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 244-45 (1911).
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968).
United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 951 (1988).
See William M. Carter, Jr., Race, Rights, and the Thirteenth Amendment: Defining the Badges
and Incidents of Slavery, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1311, 1339-55 (2007). Carter concludes, based
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Canada recently reached a similar conclusion in the process of repudiating its
precedents and recognizing the right of workers to bargain collectively under
the Canadian Charter of Rights. “It may well be appropriate for judges to defer
to legislatures on policy matters expressed in particular laws,” observed the
Court.209 “But to declare a judicial ‘no go’ zone for an entire right on the
ground that it may involve the courts in policy matters is to push deference too
far.”210 Categorical deference on that scale, combined with a willingness to
apply other difficult provisions, hints unsubtly at a class bias against working
people.
It might be argued that judicial enforcement of the Pollock principle would
amount to a revival of Lochner-Era economic due process. But the Court’s
rationale for repudiating economic due process, explained in the famous
Carolene Products footnote four, does not appear to cover the Involuntary
Servitude Clause. According to the footnote, legislatures are generally entitled
to judicial deference, but less deference may be due in cases involving “a
specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten
amendments.”211 Under this schema, the Involuntary Servitude Clause
resembles more closely the first ten amendments than “the general prohibitions
of the Fourteenth Amendment.”212 Unlike the clauses guaranteeing “equal
protection” or “liberty,” it refers to a particular relationship and provides
limiting criteria. The constitutional text prohibits “involuntary servitude,” and
there is no apparent reason—at least in the abstract—why the courts cannot
apply the already-tested approach developed in the right-to-quit cases to
resolve other labor rights claims.
Finally, it might be thought that because the Thirteenth Amendment is not
limited to governmental action, an expansive interpretation would authorize
intrusive judicial regulation of private activity.213 However, the courts have
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on the legislative debates, that the Amendment was understood to create a “concurrent
power of Congress, the judiciary, and the executive branch to enforce the freedmen’s
rights,” and not to limit the judiciary’s power to instances of literal slavery. Id. at 1345.
Health Servs. & Support-Facilities Subsector Bargaining Ass’n v. British Columbia, [2007] 2
S.C.R. 391, 414, 2007 SCC 27 (Can.).
Id.
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
Id.
Cf. George Rutherglen, The Thirteenth Amendment, the Power of Congress, and the Politics of
Civil Rights (manuscript at 10), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1473160 (suggesting that the contrast between the pattern of
judicial decisions under the self-enforcing provisions of the Thirteenth Amendment (“few
and restrictive”) and the Fourteenth Amendment (“many and expansive”) reflects the
absence of a state-action limitation in the former).
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always regulated private employment relations. Judges, not legislatures,
developed the common law of master and servant, imported the crime of labor
conspiracy from England, and developed the labor injunction. Judges continue
to shape the law of individual employment rights today. It is one thing to argue
that judges should defer to legislatures in the regulation of private activity, a
contention addressed immediately above. But the notion that judicial
regulation of private employment relations is objectionable per se is
unpersuasive in light of the fact that private employment relations have been
subject to judicial and legislative regulation from the outset.214 A more
expansive interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment would alter the
substance, not the scope, of judicial intervention in private employment
relations.
v. coercion and servitude in the jurisprudence of
involuntary servitude
The theory of Bailey and Pollock hinges, as we have seen, on the “servitude”
element of involuntary servitude. Instead of rendering servitude “voluntary,”
the right to quit gives workers the “power below” and employers the “incentive
above” to raise the employment condition above servitude. In popular
discourse, however, the focus is more likely to be on the “voluntary” element.
Surely, an individual who enjoys the right to quit could not possibly be in a
condition of slavery or involuntary servitude. If her employment descends to
servitude, then it must—by virtue of the right to quit—be voluntary servitude.
Part V probes this intuitively powerful claim and concludes that its viability
hinges on the assumption that the approach of Bailey and Pollock is working:
that the right to quit is, in fact, providing workers with the “power below” and
employers with the “incentive above” to provide employment opportunities
that rise above servitude.
The right to quit can render servitude voluntary only if, after the worker
quits, some constitutionally acceptable alternative is available. As Bailey and
Pollock make clear, for example, going to jail or facing physical punishment for
quitting is unacceptable. In addition, psychological and other nonphysical
forms of punishment (for example, warnings about possible deportation and
threats not to send money home to an immigrant worker’s family) have been
outlawed by federal legislation enacted to enforce the Thirteenth
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